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ABSTRACT

Several studies contend that humans are the weakest link in computer security, as humans often engage in non-secure
computer practices with non-malicious intent. As a countermeasure to the vulnerability of human error in computer security,
some studies posit that developing and maintaining a culture of computer security is essential for managing the human or
behavioral aspect of computer security. One aspect of computer security culture is human compliance with computer
security policy. However it is not well known how a comprehensive computer security policy effects human compliance
with computer security policy, as a literature review resulted in no studies found on this topic. For purpose of this study,
comprehensive computer security is defined as the enterprise level convergence of information technology (IT) computer
security and operational technology (OT) computer security. This finding represents a gap in IS literature. Therefore, it is
the thesis of this study that a comprehensive computer security policy has a direct effect on human compliance with computer
security policy, which can be further explained through indirect effects.
Keywords
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INTRODUCTION
Literature Review

Several studies contend that humans are the weakest link in computer security, given that humans often engage in non-secure
computer practices with non-malicious intentions. (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010; Chen, Ramamurthy, & Wen,
2012; D'Arcy & Hovav, 2007; Sasse, Brostoff, & Weirich, 2001). A non-malicious security violation (NMSV) such as
failure to recognize phishing emails, use of weak passwords, development of non-secure program code, or failure to comply
with computer security policies, poses a threat to computer security in the form of human error (Guo, Yuan, Archer, &
Connelly, 2011; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). A recent report by IBM (2014) contends that more than 95% of computer
security incidents include some aspect of human error, while a recent report by PwC (2015) states that human error
contributed to 50% of the single worst data breaches in 2015, an increase of 31% over the previous year. NMSVs are
acknowledged to represent human behavior separate from that predicated by malicious intent, with individuals engaged in
malicious human behavior sometimes referred to as hackers, bad actors or malicious insiders (Wang, Gupta, & Rao, 2015),
Given the modern day need for organizations to maintain uninterrupted access to information systems (IS) to achieve
organizational objectives, human error represents a reverse salient within computer security defense-in-depth architectures
due to the vulnerability it creates (Acuña, 2016; Dedehayir & Mäkinen, 2011; Guo et al., 2011; Hughes, 1983).
As a countermeasure to the vulnerability of human error in computer security, some studies contend that developing and
maintaining a culture of computer security is essential for managing the human, or behavioral aspect of computer security
(Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007; Dhillon, Syed, & Pedron, 2016; van Niekerk & von Solms, 2010; B. von Solms, 2000). Schein
(2004) confirms this contention by stating that culture is an abstraction, and that organizations need to understand the forces
that result from social and organizational situations lest they fall victim to them. One aspect of computer security culture is
human compliance with computer security policy (Thomson & von Solms, 2005). Several studies have published findings on
the effects of a computer security policy on computer security culture and compliance with computer security policy (D'Arcy
& Hovav, 2007; Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007).
Thus, it is a premise of this study that human compliance with computer security policy is an element of computer security
culture that contributes to managing the human aspect of computer security (S. H. von Solms, 2005). For this to be true, it is
posited that an enterprise must have an overarching computer security policy that is comprehensive in scope and ownership,
against which all impacted humans can be held compliant. However, no studies were found that explain the impact of a
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comprehensive computer security policy on human computer security compliance through an understanding of its direct or
indirect effects.
For purpose of this study, a comprehensive computer security policy is defined as a top-level enterprise policy incorporating
all aspects of enterprise computer security encompassing information technology (IT) computer security and operational
technology (OT) computer security, as opposed to only one domain or the other. The concept of merging IT computer
security which is focused on information systems security with that of OT computer security which is focused on industrial
control systems security is sometimes referred to as IT/OT convergence, and reflects a holistic approach to the practical
management of enterprise computer security (ISACA, 2016; US-CERT Publications, 2015).
This definition of a comprehensive computer security policy differs from the traditional definition of a computer security
policy that only includes aspects of a computer security program from the IT domain, as this definition also includes all
aspects of a computer security program from the OT domain. As such, a comprehensive computer security policy
encompasses all enterprise aspects of computer security thereby incorporating enterprise scope and ownership of computer
security into a single, overarching policy that binds all humans in the enterprise to a common cause. In doing so, the issue of
human error is addressed through human compliance with a shared, comprehensive computer security policy which in turn is
aligned with Schein’s (2004) formal definition of organizational culture; “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was
learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be
considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to
those problems.”
Thesis

It is the comprehensive nature of the computer security policy that separates this study from similar studies in this research
domain. Therefore, it is the thesis of this study that a comprehensive computer security policy has a direct effect on human
compliance with computer security policy, which can be further explained through indirect effects.
MOTIVATION
Comprehensive Computer Security Policy

It is not well known how a comprehensive computer security policy effects human compliance with computer security policy,
as a literature review resulted in no studies found on this topic. This finding represents a gap in IS literature and the
motivation for this study, as any computer security policy to which humans are held accountable should be explainable in
regard to the factors that influence human compliance with that policy. It is a premise of this study that human compliance
with computer security policy is an element of computer security culture that contributes to managing the human, or
behavioral aspect of computer security. In addition, it is posited that such a policy must be overarching and comprehensive in
terms of scope and ownership, against which all impacted humans can be held compliant. As defined by this study, a
computer security policy must be comprehensive in scope and ownership in order to have a meaningful effect on human
compliance with computer security policy.
This study defines a comprehensive computer security policy as a top-level policy incorporating all aspects of computer
security including research, control selection, tool selection, monitoring, incident response, and training and awareness
practices from both the IT and OT domains. A logical reference to the distinction between the IT domain and the OT domain
is that described by the Reference Model for Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM), wherein the separation between the
IT domain and the OT domain can be paraphrased as the point of demarcation between computer decision support systems
leveraged by humans (IT), and computer industrial control systems that make control decisions autonomously (OT) (CIM
Reference Model Committee International Purdue Workshop on Industrial Computer Systems, 1989). Recognition of this
distinction and the effect of joining both domains into a comprehensive computer security policy are critical to understanding
the premise of this thesis.
Thus, this research is both novel and timely in its intent to better understand the factors that influence human compliance
with a comprehensive computer security policy. This research is novel in that no peer reviewed research was found that
explained the direct effect of a comprehensive computer security policy on human computer security compliance through an
understanding of its indirect effects. This research is timely in that modern computer threats and computer vulnerabilities,
sometimes referred to as cybersecurity, are evolving rapidly and are capable of introducing significant computer risk to an
organization (D'Arcy & Hovav, 2007; National Intelligence Council, 2008; U.S. Government, 2011; U.S. PPD-41, 2016; UK
Government, 2016). These beliefs are grounded in the thesis of this study that a comprehensive computer security policy has
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a direct effect on human compliance with computer security policy, which can be further explained through indirect effects.
As this paper represents research-in-progress, the following content includes sections comprising the research model,
research methodology, expected results and contribution, findings and publication, and other documentation necessary to
support this thesis.
RESEARCH MODEL
Theory of Planned Behavior

The theory of planned behavior (TPB) seeks to predict and understand motivational influences on human behavior. Defined
by Ajzen (1991), TPB states that human behavior is determined by factors that influence the intention to perform a specific
behavior. TPB consists of five constructs; subjective norms, attitude toward the behavior, perceived behavioral control,
intention, and behavior. Rather than model specific human behavior, TPB models human behavioral intention. The stronger
the intention to perform the behavior, the more likely it is that the specific behavior will be performed. Perceived behavioral
control varies across situations and actions, and in some cases can be used directly to predict a successful behavioral attempt.

Figure 1. Theoretical Foundation
Social Identity Theory

Hogg, Terry, & White (1995) contend that social identity theory (SIT) is an accepted perspective on the social constructs of
self-concept and normative behavior. The authors also contend that SIT shares the same perspective as identity theory, with
the primary distinction being that SIT is a proven psychology theory used to explain group processes and intergroup
relations. SIT is used to explain behavioral tendencies that cause people to classify themselves and others into various social
categories such as religious affiliation, organizational recognition, gender, and age. Ashforth & Mael (1989) posit that this
classification gives a person the ability to segment and order the social environment into a meaningful structure, and then
locate and define themselves in that social environment. By socially identifying with a group, the individual is viewed as
sharing in the group’s success and status. Cheung & Lee (2010) contend that social identity helps to determine collective
intention to perform a behavior. The authors also contend that if an end user exhibits strong social identity toward a group
behavior, then intention will increase.
Interaction Theory

Change is often met with resistance, and the introduction of change will encounter resistance from those who are held
accountable to the change. Markus (1983) contends that interaction theory (INT) provides a framework against which the
introduction of change can be better managed. INT is posited to be useful with decentralized systems when a centralized
system is desired, and with systems that alter the balance of power in regard to those who lose power and those who gain
power. Kling (1980) posits that people and groups resist change introduced by system implementation due to the interaction
between characteristics in people and characteristics related to the system. From this perspective the greater the implied
change, the more likely the resistance to the change. Markus (1983) posits that INT represents a superior method for
developing IS implementation strategies for managing beliefs about resistance during IS implementation.
Deterrence Theory

IS studies leverage deterrence theory (DET) to explain unethical human behavior involving the use of technology in
organizations. DET suggests that the perceived certainty and severity of formal sanctions serves as a deterrent to committing
an illicit act (D'Arcy & Devaraj, 2012). D’Arcy & Devaraj contend that the threat of formal sanctions has both direct and
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indirect influences on the intentional misuse of technology. Hu, Xu, Dinev, & Ling (2011) report findings that contradict the
accepted view of DET and information security by stating that behavior is influenced more by an individual’s personal ethics
or moral compass, than the ramifications of a deterrent alone. This aligns with Siponen & Vance (2010) who contend that
deterrence is less effective when neutralization techniques that minimize perceived harm are detected.
Theoretical Foundation

Given the perceived influence of social identity, interaction with others, and the effect of sanction rhetoric in positively
effecting intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy, the theoretical concepts of SIT, INT, and DET
are incorporated into the theoretical foundation as antecedent theories to TPB (Figure 1). This theoretical foundation
contributes to a better understanding of human behavior and NMSVs. This theoretical foundation also aligns with Schein’s
formal definition of organizational culture; “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its
problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to
be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.”
Hypotheses Development

This study draws on TPB to predict human intent to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy. The use of TPB
in IS literature to predict human intent is well documented (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Dinev & Hu, 2007; Flores & Ekstedt,
2016; Guo et al., 2011; Pavlou & Fygenson, 2006; Song & Zahedi, 2005). Based on the documented use of TPB in IS
research, hypotheses drawn against the TPB constructs of subjective norms, attitude, and perceived behavioral control are
included in the research model but have been modified to support this study. These hypotheses are included for
completeness, as the research model cannot be tested without these paths.
This study also incorporates constructs drawn from SIT, INT, and DET as antecedent constructs to TPB constructs to better
understand the indirect factors that predict human intent to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy. In doing
so, this study makes a unique contribution to IS literature by incorporating TPB with other behavioral theories through the
use of antecedent constructs.
Drawing from the use of SIT in IS studies, Cheung & Lee (2010) leveraged SIT to measure group intention to use a social
networking site by measuring subjective norms and social identity. The authors contend that subjective norms reflect social
pressure from significant others to perform a behavior, as a user tends to rely on subjective norms to decide whether or not to
use a new technology. The authors posit that if an end user exhibits strong social identity toward a group behavior, then
intention will increase. Song & Kim (2006) synthesized the progenitor of TPB, the theory of reasoned action (TRA), and
SIT to predict behavioral intention to use a service. Specifically, the authors leveraged SIT, TRA, and relationships between
the constructs of social identity and subjective norms to predict user intention.
Drawing from the use of INT in IS studies, Markus (1983) posits that INT represents a superior method for managing beliefs
about resistance to change, and that INT offers a superior theory for managing the resistance encountered during information
system implementation. INT is posited to be useful with decentralized systems when a centralized system is desired, and
with systems that alter the balance of power in regard to those who lose power and those who gain power.
Drawing from the use of DET in IS studies yields mixed results. While several studies contend that enforcement activities
are an important part of any information security culture, IS studies incorporating DET have revealed positive and negative
influences on intention. D’Arcy & Devaraj (2012) contend that the threat of formal sanctions has direct and indirect
influences on an individual’s intention to misuse information assets. Herath & Rao (2009) posit that sanctions are an
effective mechanism in reducing negative behavior and exhibit a positive influence on social behavior. Johnston, Warkentin,
& Siponen (2015) contend sanction rhetoric that emphasizes the impact of both personal relevance and IS relevance provides
a positive influence on intention to comply with information security policy, confirming that sanction rhetoric influences
human intention.
Path Diagram

Therefore, based on the usage pattern of TPB, SIT, INT, and DET in IS research, the research model for this study leverages
a modified version of TPB to measure the factors that influence human intention to comply with a comprehensive computer
security policy. The traditional TPB constructs of subjective norms, attitude, and perceived behavioral control are modeled
in expected form as independent variables against a construct of intention as the dependent variable. New constructs of
comprehensive computer security policy, social identity with organizational others, resistance to policy compliance, and
perceived effect of sanctions for non-compliance are incorporated as antecedent constructs to TPB to further measure the
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predictability of human intent to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy. The path diagram shown in Figure
2 models the inclusion of TPB constructs, new SIT, INT, DET, and comprehensive computer security policy antecedent
constructs, 3 indirect (mediating) paths, 1 direct path, 6 control (moderating) variables, 10 research hypotheses, 1 dependent
variable (intention to comply), several independent variables, 1 exogenous construct (comprehensive computer security
policy), and several endogenous constructs.

Figure 2. TPB Base Research Model with Antecedent Constructs (Path Diagram)
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Survey Instrument and Data Collection

The research methodology for this study includes the collection of data using a survey instrument, and analysis of the
collected data using multivariate data analysis techniques (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2009; Kumar, 2005; Trochim &
Donnelly, 2008). The survey instrument will utilize a unipolar 7-point Likert scale for measurement (Ajzen, 1991). Where
possible, use case scenarios and questions for the survey instrument will be drawn from previous studies conducted in this
research domain (Flores & Ekstedt, 2016; Guo et al., 2011; Pavlou & Fygenson, 2006). Six control variables are planned for
this study; age, gender, education, IT/OT identity, years of professional computer experience, and industry sector.
Questionnaire distribution and data collection will be performed by Qualtrics (2016), a commercial Internet service that
specializes in survey based research. Although the survey instrument will be modeled after IS studies that leveraged TPB
survey research, a pilot survey will be conducted prior to the primary data survey to ensure robustness. The target population
for this study is authorized users located in the United States, randomly selected from defined industry sectors. It is the
intention of this study that all identifiers capable of linking a response to a participant, including Internet Protocol (IP)
address, will be hidden and unknown to the principal investigator.
Sample Size

Hair et al. (2009) recommend a sample size of 100 to 400 observations for SEM studies. The most common SEM estimation
procedure is maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) which supports a minimum sample size of 50, but recommends a sample
size of 200 to provide a sound basis for estimation. Sample sizes greater than 400 become sensitive to meaningless
differences resulting in goodness-of-fit (GOF) measures that suggest a poor fit. Therefore, based on MLE recommendations,
a sample size of 200 (minimum) to 250 (maximum) responses is targeted for this study. A maximum of 250 responses
compares favorably to MLE recommendations, and provides a small buffer should a less than reasonably high response rate
be realized.
Data Analysis

Multivariate data analysis techniques to be performed on the collected data include confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and
structural equation modeling (SEM). CFA and SEM are often used together to measure the validity of a research model, to
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determine whether or not the estimated model fits the observed model. CFA is a statistical test used to determine how well
the factors described by the theoretical model match the reality of data gathered by the study observations. SEM is a family
of statistical models used to explain relationship strength between the multiple variables that are linked together in a path
diagram (Figure 2). SEM performs this task by examining relationships between the independent variables and the
dependent variable in a path diagram as a series of equations similar to a series of multiple regression equations.
SEM and CFA analyses can be performed using one of several computer software packages. This study will use the LISREL
(LInear Structural RELations) computer programming language to perform CFA and SEM analyses. While SEM models
such as the TPB Base Research Model with Antecedent Constructs depicted in Figure 2 are often drawn using simplified path
diagrams to describe dependence relationships between independent (exogenous) and dependent (endogenous) variables,
SEM models can also be drawn using a lexicon known as LISREL notation. Although LISREL refers specifically to a
widely used computer program for SEM modeling, the LISREL platform includes a unique lexicon known as LISREL
notation to depict and describe SEM models (Hair et al., 2009).
Goodness-of-Fit

SEM goodness-of-fit (GOF) measurement compares theory to reality by comparing the difference between the estimated
covariance matrix, or theory, to the observed covariance matrix, or reality (Hair et al., 2009). If the modeled theory is
perfect then a comparison of the estimated covariance matrix and the observed covariance matrix will show no difference, a
perfect fit, between the two matrices. For SEM, the implied null hypothesis is that there is no difference between the
estimated covariance matrix, or theory, and the observed covariance matrix, or reality, meaning that the research model is a
good fit with reality. One statistic used to measure variance between the two matrices is chi-square (χ2). Given that the value
of χ2 increases as the variance between the two matrices increases, we also reference the p-value associated with χ2 to assess
the equality of the estimated covariance matrix and the observed covariance matrix within a given population (Hair et al.,
2009). This leads to desired critical values of a relatively small χ2 value that approaches zero (0), and a correspondingly large
p-value that approaches one (1).
However, due to known problems using χ2 as a test statistic for SEM GOF, Hair et al. (2009) suggest that SEM studies report
at least one absolute GOF index and one incremental GOF index in addition to χ2. Absolute GOF indexes include χ2, root
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and the goodness-of-fit index (GFI). Incremental GOF indexes include the
normed fit index (NFI), and the comparative fit index (CFI).
EXPECTED RESULTS AND CONTRIBUTION
Expected Results

The thesis of this study is that a comprehensive computer security policy has a direct effect on human compliance with
computer security policy, which can be further explained through indirect effects. It is a premise of this study that human
compliance with computer security policy is an element of computer security culture that contributes to managing the human
aspect of computer security. This study is both novel and timely in its intent to better understand the factors that influence
human compliance with a comprehensive computer security policy, and minimize the vulnerability that is human error. It is
anticipated that the statistical findings of this study will support these beliefs and will benefit researchers and practitioners in
several ways.
Contribution

First, this research represents a contribution to IS literature in that no peer reviewed research was found that explains the
direct effect of a comprehensive computer security policy on human computer security compliance through an understanding
of its indirect effects. This study also contributes to IS literature in that it incorporates new antecedent constructs from SIT,
INT, and DET with traditional TPB constructs to better understand the factors that influence human intent to comply with a
comprehensive computer security policy. Completion of this study will provide researchers with a descriptive understanding
of the direct and indirect effects on human intention to comply with a comprehensive computer security policy.
Second, the prescriptive application of a shared comprehensive computer security policy will have a positive impact on
enterprise computer security awareness and reduced human error. A better understanding of the practical benefits of
compliance with a comprehensive computer security policy will lead to improved computer security awareness, which will
help manage the resistance to change that is often encountered when change alters the perception of power in regard to those
who lose power and those who gain power. Improved computer security awareness will also contribute to an increase in self-
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efficacy and personal intent to comply with such a policy, resulting in the direct effect of reduced human error and fewer
occurrences of NMSVs.
Third, this research is timely in that modern computer threats and computer vulnerabilities are evolving rapidly and are
capable of introducing significant risk to both the IT computer domain and the OT computer domain. Publication of this
study will help draw attention to the practical need for convergence of IT computer security and OT computer security. This
contribution is underscored by the notion that theory is not the exclusive domain of academia, but can also be found in the
experience and practice gathered through the observation of real world behavior (Hair et al., 2009; Lee, 1999).
Lastly, the practical application of these findings will benefit the enterprise by helping to develop a comprehensive culture of
computer security by incorporating enterprise scope and ownership of computer security into a single, overarching policy that
binds all humans in the enterprise to a common cause. The findings from this study will reinforce Schein’s contention that
culture is an abstraction, and that organizations need to understand the forces that result from social and organizational
situations lest they fall victim to them. In addition, the findings will contribute to the ongoing development and persistence
of organizational culture as defined by Schein; “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved
its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and,
therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.”
FINDINGS AND PUBLICATION

There are no findings to report at this time as this paper represents research-in-progress. A research application has been
filed with the Dakota State University (DSU) Institutional Review Board (IRB). The data collection phase is scheduled to
begin in 1Q2017, which will be followed by the data analysis phase. Completion of this study is scheduled for 2Q2017.
Final results will be presented in a public forum at DSU, and submitted for publication in an academic journal shortly
thereafter.
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